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HOW TO ASSESS THE VALUE OF A BUSINESS MODEL PORTFOLIO? 
 
 [Insert Table 1 here: leading question]  
The past decade’s business landscape has been shaped by the “disruptive” insurgence of new entrants 
across a diverse range of industries – such as Dell, Southwest Airlines, Netflix, Amazon, Spotify among 
others – thus bringing attention to the use of innovative “business models” as forming a new basis for 
competitive advantage.1 In addition, the undisputable success of multi-sided business models – i.e., those 
connecting two groups of users such as Uber or Airbnb – and their leveraging a vast array of ordinary 
resources, has challenged many traditional strategic approaches to competitive positioning through the 
deployment of unique resources.2 More recently, the locus of attention has shifted to the simultaneous 
employment of “dual business models”3 as means of enhancing a firm’s competitive position. A portfolio 
of multiple business models (two or more) offers a discrete and unique diversification opportunity that 
deserves attention in terms of the resources and capabilities it generates. We submit a non-intuitive way to 
analyze business model portfolios in light of their link to capabilities that imply strategic resources other 
than only financials and focus on value creation as the starting point for growth and performance. 
The case for “business model diversification” as an additional and distinct type of strategic 
diversification5 can be best understood by looking, for example, at Netflix’s disruptive market entry, 
which, in employing two disparate business models (DVD-by-mail and online streaming) in tandem, 
enabled the company to actively compete against well-established incumbents, such as Blockbuster. 6 
While Netflix’ successful market penetration and growth are undisputable, particularly in the initial years, 
they cannot be explained by “traditional” types of corporate diversification. In essence, such traditional 
strategic manoeuvers aim at expanding the scope of a firm with respects to the product and/or 
geographical markets in which it competes, as well as the reach of vertically-related activities. Indeed, the 
“online streaming” business model offered the same movies as the “DVD-by-mail” business model, the 
latter which were provided to its US customer base through its own technological platform. Yet, it did 
present a different monetization system (i.e., different subscription prices), a distinct value delivery 
mechanism (i.e., digital vs. physical), and value-added services (i.e., tailored recommendation system). 
This business model diversification allowed Netflix to gain considerable market share, after which it 
expanded its global footprint (it now serves over 190 countries), product portfolio (TV shows), and 
vertically integrated (as it produces its original content). 
The success of Netflix demonstrates that the joint adoption of multiple business models offers unique 
opportunities to overhaul competition. But such “success stories” are, more often than not, company-
specific. They look at how firms employ specific business models to match their resources and capabilities 
to external opportunities (i.e., the growth of the Internet). Yet, taking a closer look at firms competing in 
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the same arena or industry (i.e., Formula 1 racing teams) has shown that a specific portfolio of business 
models can be associated with higher performance than for those employing different configurations. The 
high-performing configuration allowed firms, over a first phase, to access valuable resources, in turn 
leading to the development of high-level capabilities. 
From a strategic standpoint, business models contribute to a firm’s unique collection of resources7 and 
capabilities.8 While resources encompass all of the productive assets owned by the firm, capabilities, on 
the other hand, arise by combining multiple resources and embedding them into a firm’s complex set of 
activities, tacit knowledge, and routines.9 As such, they embody a superior lever to sustainable competitive 
advantage, which is thus hard to imitate. Combining and integrating one’s resources to establish a unique 
bundle of capabilities is the key to profitability. In this light, business model portfolios are to be examined 
in terms of the resources and capabilities they generate, mobilize, and exploit through synergies, to boost 
firm’s economic return. 
 
THE CONUNDRUMS OF BUSINESS MODEL DIVERSIFICATION 
Despite the potential of business model diversification in yielding growth and performance 
enhancement opportunities, companies lack specific tools and frameworks to systematically assess the 
mutual value of each business model in their portfolio, and thus their strategic contribution to competitive 
advantage. Strategy scholars warn that business model diversification is a complex strategy. Often 
multiple business models are mutually incompatible in light of potential risks of cannibalization and 
resource dilution, which may ultimately erode the value of existing activities.10 
The past decades offer numerous cases supporting this view. One of the most popular examples of 
business model innovation is that of Dell’s, whose “direct business model” fundamentally altered the 
structure of the PC industry. Following its acclaimed success, many incumbents – such as IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Compaq and others – attempted to retaliate by adopting the novel business model alongside their 
existing ones. This straddling position led to the erosion of the incumbents’ existing competitive 
advantages. Rather than sharing synergies across resources, the adoption of the new business model not 
only required a distinct set of assets (i.e., flexible fabrication lines) but also relied on disparate capabilities 
(i.e., Dell’s distinctive competencies revolved around customer relationship management and supply-chain 
orchestration). Also, because the new business model implied alienating its existing customer base (i.e., 
by-passing distributors), these attempts ultimately created “substitution effects” and displaced earlier key 
capabilities. Understanding when and how business model portfolios work requires a perspective that 
includes capabilities because the underlying resources generated by the business models need to align and 
enhance capabilities that are mutually constitutive rather than substitutive.  
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THE CASE FOR BUSINESS MODEL DIVERSIFICATION 
But what about the firms that have successfully adopted multiple business models? The airline industry 
can be viewed as a laboratory for the investigation of various business model dynamics. It shows how 
firms such as LAN Airlines have successfully implemented additional business models, whilst others, 
such as Continental Airlines with Continental Lite, have failed to tap into their industry’s low-cost 
segment. The latter case can be explained by the inherent conflicts as firms overlook the trade-offs that 
arise from their strategic positioning. However, the former case suggests that there may be a profitable 
way to capitalize on one’s assets and exploit the powerful potential of complementarities. In enacting a 
portfolio of three business models (full-service, air-cargo, and no-frills), LAN Airlines leveraged the same 
resource base (i.e., maximize the use of its aircrafts) to exploit new opportunities (i.e., expansion of 
customer base, new routes), thus generating greater value (i.e., economies of scale, profit 
diversification).11 By capitalizing on its resource complementarity, LAN created a cycle of mutually 
reinforcing advantages and enhancement of capabilities. 
According to Michael Porter,12 strategic diversification is about combining activities that efficiently 
relate and mutually reinforce one another – as a system of activities, not a mere collection of isolated ones. 
In this way, strategic fit across activities holds the potential to exponentially multiply the value of those 
assets, and support competitive advantage and superior profitability. This echoes a common definition of 
the business model: a system of interdependent organizational activities designed to create unique value 
for customers and appropriate such value in ways that maximize revenues.13 But what about strategic fit 
across business models? If the fit among intra-business model activities reduces cost or increases 
differentiation – and is also fundamental to the sustainability of that advantage – then the existence of 
intra-business model portfolio complementarities suggests that there may also exist a fit between a 
portfolio’s independent activities, and that such configurations can in fact offer unique opportunities for 
increased performance. 
How can companies assess when diversifying into a business model portfolio will increase their overall 
performance? And if a company wants to streamline its activities, how to assess which business model to 
minimize or eventually drop? Building on former contributions (see “About the research”),14 we have 
identified three key questions that executives need to consider when assessing the value of a business 
model portfolio, and we suggest a framework to represent and assess business model portfolio 
configurations in relation to resources, capabilities and performance.  
[Insert Table 2 here: Successful diversification] 
 5 
QUESTION #1: WHAT ARE THE KEY ASPECTS TO CONSIDER WHEN EVALUATING A BUSINESS 
MODEL PORTFOLIO? 
Because resources and capabilities are widely accepted as being strategically important, appraising the 
value of a business model portfolio must logically begin with the examination of the former. As such, we 
begin by asking: “to what extent do the business models within a portfolio mobilize the same resources?” 
The case of LAN Airlines shows how sharing of strategic resources across business models offers 
powerful opportunities for cost efficiency. Indeed, leveraging the same physical assets can enable a firm to 
enjoy economies of scope and eliminate redundancies, especially in capital-intensive industries. 
Technology-based environments – such as the Formula 1 industry – also require effective resource 
deployment, thus motivating firms to leverage the same technology for multiple commercial uses (i.e., 
technology transfer to automotive firms) – ultimately generating multiple revenue streams. 
While it goes without saying that revenue diversification may directly impact a company’s growth, it 
also offers a subtler benefit, that of risk reduction. Consider the case of bio-pharmaceutical firms. Because 
they operate in highly uncertain environments – where time lags between investments and returns are 
extremely long – players have shown to balance the risks by exploiting their existing set of resources and 
capabilities and cross-subsidizing the latter in multiple ways. Optimizing resource deployment across 
business model portfolios serves as the first stepping-stone in assessing its potential to yield superior 
performance. Bio-pharmaceutical firms often run multiple business models that also provide access to 
valuable assets – such as financial or knowledge resources.15 Here arises another key question to consider: 
“Does enacting the portfolio always create access to valuable resources?” Where this is the case, we can 
say that the portfolio generates positive complementarities in it creating cross-business synergies.  
Typically, firms successfully competing within the Formula 1 industry enjoy access to financial 
resources depending on their racing performance. But for those who employ an additional “Supply 
business model,” whereby firms supply others Formula 1 firms with standard components, they gain 
access to critical telemetry data – an intangible resource which provides insights for improving racing 
performance. Consequently, multiple business models that generate compatible resources offer great 
opportunities for enhancing the performance of core activities.  
Over and above, a business model portfolio’s penultimate value lies in its potential to create unique 
organizational capabilities. If positive complementarities arise when a portfolio of business models 
mobilizes and generates compatible resources, then cross-capability synergies hold the potential to create 
unique growth and performance enhancement opportunities. This is precisely the nature of the 
complementarities underpinning the high-performing Formula 1 business model configuration.16 The 
adoption of a specific portfolio created a virtuous cycle of mutually reinforcing dynamics: together, the 
business models fostered faster learning by providing access to knowledge resources, enabling the 
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development of human resources and cost efficiencies, which in turn created better technology-
development capabilities. As such, if the answer to the question “does the portfolio of business models 
enhance the organization’s capabilities” is yes, then we know the portfolio’s synergies offers unique 
opportunities for increased performance and establish a hard-to-imitate competitive advantage. 
 
QUESTION #2: IF I HAVE TO ADD A BUSINESS MODEL, HOW CAN I PRE-ASSESS ITS VALUE? 
However, as tempting as “synergetic” business model diversification may seem, such a strategic 
manoeuver can also be beset by certain risks. Whatever the motivations underlying managers’ choice to 
diversify into portfolios, how can they ensure that the novel configuration of business models will in fact 
achieve the longed for synergies? The answer is quite simple: by designing a business model whose 
resources and capabilities are strongly embedded within the existing business model(s). 
Let us begin by looking once again at the firm’s resources. In designing an additional business model, 
managers should first and foremost aspire to devise one whose resources are strongly “related” to the ones 
their firms already possess – as to achieve economies of scope, greater capacity utilization, and eliminate 
duplication. This serves as the basis for their exploration of cross-business model linkages, and thus in 
crafting a robust and synergetic portfolio. 
This point is especially important in light of the past decades’ focus on strategic resources, stemming 
from the perspective that competitive advantage solely relied on the control of valuable and scarce 
resources. This view has motivated many organizations to invest a significant part of their efforts and 
capital in acquiring and safeguarding such “extraordinary assets.”17 However, not only does the ownership 
of specific strategic resources inherently constrain the scope of a firm’s activities in and of themselves – 
via the limited flexibilities of an organization’s resources – but exaggerated perseverance in protecting 
such “rare” resources can lead to organizational rigidity, and ultimately restrain a firm’s propensity for 
innovation.18 Business model diversification offers profitable opportunities for organizations which have, 
in the past, allocated a significant part of their capital in securing rare resources. Where the novel business 
model leverages the latter resources, whilst offering additional sources of value creation and capture, the 
basic “cost efficiency” of the additional business model is pre-secured. In this light, managers need to start 
by asking: how can my novel business model maximize the use of my current resource base? How can I 
innovate with the resources I currently possess?  
Consider the Nokia case. By the early 2000s, it had succeeded in overhauling Motorola and had grown 
to become the global leader of mobile handset providers. Its expansion strategy was founded upon the 
exclusive control of strategic – and very costly – resources (i.e., in 2007, Nokia acquired the navigation 
database provider Navteq for $8.1 billion). However valuable the ownership of such data seemed at the 
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time, this in fact contributed to the rigidity of its organizational structure and an over-emphasis on 
financial return maximization – rather than a focus on strategic value creation. This, in turn, entailed the 
failure to morph and capitalize upon the dynamic opportunities offered by the new information-based 
world. When Apple introduced the iPhone and its disruptive business model – as an eco-system of 
complementary assets designed to support and enhance the end-user consumption experience – Nokia 
failed to recognize the shifting industry dynamics, and focused on safeguarding the value of what it 
thought to be an exceptional portfolio of unique resources. In 2012, Microsoft acquired Nokia for the 
“mere” price of $7.2 billion – even less than what it had paid to acquire Navteq five years earlier.   
On the other hand, if Nokia would have fought Apple’s disruptive insurgence into the smartphone 
market by introducing a business model that leveraged its vast array of resources, we assume it would 
have managed to at least stay competitively viable. A diversification move via a business model addition 
could have entailed for Nokia additional revenue streams – i.e., through a novel “value capture” 
mechanism, such as an additional commercial use of its cartographic data – and/or a novel demonstration 
of customer value – i.e., through an innovative “value creation” rationale, such as the pioneer integration 
of a basic navigation system within the Nokia smartphone.  
Faced with the delicate task of designing an additional business model, managers need to critically ask 
themselves: do the value-chain activities required by my new business model fully integrate and 
exhaustively exploit my current resource base? Where the answer is yes, they can expect the portfolio not 
only to generate important cost efficiencies, but also to provide opportunities for risk reduction through 
the cross-subsidization of the portfolio’s inter-related activities. 
Take the iconic Amazon case. We all know of the firm’s disruptive business model innovation. It 
started off as an online bookstore in 1995 and, more than twenty years later, has become the biggest online 
retailer in the world – and now enacts a portfolio of seven business models. In the making, Amazon had to 
significantly invest in powerful servers and in the development of a robust automated web infrastructure, 
with initially the sole objective of powering its website’s massive traffic. Over the years, Amazon’s efforts 
gave birth to a technological prowess and invaluable expertise in the development of web and data 
infrastructures, which motivated the giant to capitalize on the latter resources and capabilities, by 
implementing an additional business model offering a cloud-computing platform – now referred to as 
Amazon Web Services – to other firms who lacked such infrastructure. Today, its customer base accounts 
for other giants, such as Netflix19, and now serves as the leading cloud-computing service provider. 
[Insert Table 3 here: Amazon’s business models]  
 The ownership of such resources proved to be not only of immense value for Amazon’s core e-
business activities, but also a potent profit opportunity as a stand-alone business model. Indeed, the 
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Amazon Web Services business model now represents the organization’s biggest profit share – accounting 
for over 56% of its operating income20 – and brings in more than $10 billions of yearly revenues. While 
the lion share of Amazon’s revenues remains its core e-retailing model, the “Web Services” business 
model serves as a “cash cow” that endows the giant with substantial financial resources. These resources, 
in turn, serve to subsidize the huge capital requirements entailed by other business models – i.e., the 
“Prime” business model, which offers its subscribers premium services such as free expedited shipping. 
By financially fueling these business models and ensuring their survival, Amazon enjoys access to other 
critical intangible resources – i.e., “Prime” grants substantial knowledge resources, such as user 
consumption data, but also serves to sustain critical reputational resources. 
Resources and capabilities are inextricably linked to one another – as the latter build on the former – 
and thus, the boundaries between the two are elusive. In reality, they are not necessarily separable. Their 
appraisal is not an exact science, nor does it need it to be. Going back to Amazon Web Services, one can 
regard this business model diversification move from the perspective of resource co-deployment, so as to 
create an additional revenue stream. Yet, the latter technological infrastructures and expertise are 
inherently inseparable from its technology development capabilities, and exemplifies how a firm’s higher-
level capabilities are in fact by-products of embedding resources within organizational routines.  
Rather, when designing a novel business model, a disparate examination of resources and capabilities 
can provide managers with different lenses – and thus opportunities – to achieve the one same goal – that 
is, the culmination of an optimal level of intra business-model portfolio synergies. To illustrate this point, 
let us take a “capability perspective” to re-examine the Nokia vs. Apple case. The former’s excessive 
perseverance in safeguarding the value of its resources inhibited the critical development of capabilities – 
ones that would have contributed to what is today an obsolete competitive advantage. On the other hand, 
not only did Apple leverage its superior design and product development capabilities and transfer them to 
serve additional product markets – over and above PCs – but also capitalized on its exceptional 
management and marketing capabilities and integrated the “whole” to develop a unique value proposition 
and customer engagement mechanism – in other words, a business model innovation21. This enabled 
Apple – to the surprise of many, at the time – to first disrupt the digital music industry (i.e., iTunes and 
iPod), in turn paving the way for its insurgence in the smartphone market (i.e., iPhone), which ultimately 
reinforced its position in the computer market (i.e., iOS system).  
When crafting an additional business model, managers need to ensure that the latter will leverage their 
firm’s existing distinctive capabilities22. Why is it so important? Put simply, a firm’s distinctive 
capabilities embody what a firm does best, better than its competitors. An idiosyncratic set of capabilities 
integrates resources gained from experience and mastery, such as tacit knowledge23, know-how, and 
management systems (all stemming from the gradual increase in an organization’s experience curve). 
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Thus, if managers extend such unrivalled competences to the service of additional value creation and 
capture mechanisms, not only can the firm benefit from existing economies of learning but can also 
exponentially increase its learning curve – by improving routines and enhancing existing capabilities, and 
even creating new ones.   
As such, they need to fundamentally ask themselves: how can I translate my capabilities over and 
above their current functional boundaries? In doing so, managers must first examine and delineate the 
structure of their current business model(s) activities. Only then can they inquire into how the novel 
business model can replicate an analogous architecture of activities – fundamentally based on capabilities. 
To be clear, this abstraction task is not a simple one; in fact, it may come as quite the conceptual 
challenge. And yet, careful investigation may yield very fruitful answers, and pave the way for potent and 
dynamic cross-business model linkages – and unique growth opportunities that transcend industry and 
product market boundaries. Ensuring that a novel business model is embedded within an organization’s 
existing capabilities is not only beneficial in terms of efficiency, but also serves as a catalyst for the 
enhancement of the latter and ultimately, to unprecedented performance.  
Let us return to Amazon’s portfolio of business models. Yes, it is in the enactment of a synergetic 
business model portfolio that lies the secret to Amazon’s unique competitive advantage. It empowers 
Amazon with explosive growth trajectories, as the highly complementary business models all dynamically 
work together in generating mutually reinforcing advantages. The “Web Services” business model 
subsidizes the “Prime” and “Fulfilment” business models – making Amazon financially self-sustainable. 
What is more, these business models, in addition to “Instant Video,” act in fact as value-creation 
complements to enhance the “Marketplace” value proposition, and galvanize the sales and performance of 
the latter focal activities; but also strengthen its core competencies in the provision of exceptional 
customer service, user experience and supply-chain orchestration. 
In being the leading online retail marketplace, Amazon naturally attracts a huge number of seller-
customers who seek to increase their visibility via the platform (further catalyzed by the “Fulfilment” 
value proposition). This provides an extensive range of available products which, coupled with low prices, 
attract buyer-customer demand. This increased demand, in turn, generates more Prime subscriptions, 
whose bundle of value-added services in and of itself serves to ensure that buyer-customers remain loyal 
and frequently purchase on the Marketplace – thus driving its sales. Prime memberships also empower 
Amazon with more customer consumption data – which serves to enhance customer service and online 
retail experience, amongst other focal value creation activities. This, in turn, attracts more buyer demand, 
which attracts more sellers, which ensure low-cost products, and so on.  
[Insert Figure 1 here: Amazon’s business models, resources, capabilities and performance] 
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As such, the joint adoption of the five complementary business models provides the e-commerce 
megalith with access to critical resources, that serve to augment its value creation activities and 
capabilities (see “About the Research”), and to fuel network effects for the explosive growth of its core e-
retail platform. But what about the nature of the relationships with the remaining business models? The 
Consumer Electronics Manufacturing business model has specifically been deployed as an attempt to 
support the Amazon eco-system. Simply put, this backwards integration manoeuver aimed at offering to 
its core e-retail customers cheap technological products (i.e., Kindle reader, Kindle Fire, Fire TV, Fire 
Phone, Dash Button), bundled and sold with access to other business model attributes (i.e., Fire Phone: 
Firefly button). As such, the deployment of this “razor-and-blade” business model epitomizes Amazon’s 
direct pursuit of portfolio complementarities, in order to drive sales and growth of its core activities. And 
yet, amongst its seven business models, it is in fact the one that enjoys the least synergies with the others. 
In fact, it entails a focus drift from its core activities in favor of unrelated extra-industry activities, thus 
resulting in financial and strategic losses – as illustrated by the very disappointing Fire Phone launch and 
its subsequent rapid market withdrawal. 
 
QUESTION #3: IF I HAVE TO DROP ONE BUSINESS MODEL, WHICH ONE SHOULD IT BE? 
However much appealing the idea of cross-business-model “synergies” may seem, its practical application 
is rarely as straightforward as one would wish. Nor is the successful execution of intra business model 
portfolio complementarities. In fact, the most synergetic portfolios often encompass specific business 
models whose dynamics would have never intuitively been thought of as so mutually reinforcing. In this 
light, portfolio robustness – and synergies – must be examined from a granular and critical perspective.  
To illustrate this example, let us go back to the Consumer Electronics Manufacturing business model 
and examine the rationale behind its deployment. Amazon’s substantial technological resource base 
morphed, over time, into new technology development capabilities. Intuitively, one can naturally assume 
that these new capabilities could be strategically extended to the development of technologies that, in 
theory, would complement online retail activities. However, in practice, this business model 
diversification does not leverage Amazon’s distinctive capabilities. Yes, Amazon has grown to cultivate 
capabilities in technology development, mostly in the area of online platform and big data management; 
but this is quite different from technological development in consumer electronics, which is not what it 
does best. As such, crafting an additional business model that aims to extend non-core competencies will 
not yield capability-enhancing complementarities, and thus will fail to generate synergies for the overall 
portfolio. More so, if two business models do not leverage the same capabilities and serve strategically 
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dissimilar industries, the overall dynamics will create detrimental inefficiencies and possibly substitution 
effects. 
In this light, managers must constantly audit and critically examine the inter-relationships across their 
business model portfolio. Like traditional types of corporate diversification, business model diversification 
embodies a strategic conundrum, and does not always generate superior performance. As such, where a 
business model does not generate the coveted intra-portfolio synergies, managers must not be afraid to 
streamline the latter, so as to focus and bolster those activities that are strategically optimal.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR VALUE CREATION 
Every organization’s paramount purpose is to create value; whatever activities it undertakes, whatever 
product markets it serves, whatever stakeholders it engages with, it exists to generate value. Value is the 
basis for customer satisfaction, for growth and performance, and ultimately the purpose of the enterprise. 
By the same token, the perennial quest of strategic management revolves around the exploitation of each 
and every opportunity available within an organization’s habitat in the name of value creation. Strategic 
management tends to overlook the bigger picture in favor of a more narrow focus on financial 
performance, which is only one albeit important indicator of success. Value creation and value capture 
make the business model and the resources and capabilities underlying the portfolio of business models 
include but are by no means limited to financial resources. Pursuing knowledge and reputation sustains 
Amazon and in the case of Formula One racing performance does not map well onto the teams that 
perform well financially. The core question for any manager points to the purpose of the enterprise and 
often boils down to: how do I structure the portfolio of business models? 
Business model diversification means assessing the synergies of the portfolio and must be achieved 
through a configurational perspective in order to determine whether the joint adoption of multiple 
business models leads to superior performance and serves the purpose of the enterprise. If managers 
inquire into every business model separately they seldom perceive the strategic value of 
complementarities that underpin the overall portfolio (i.e., if one looks at the “Prime” in isolation, it will 
appear financially unviable). Thus, they will miss out on the portfolio’s “global optimum” as the essence 
of its value does not necessarily rest in its profitability in and of itself but rather how it enhances an 
organization’s capabilities.  
As such, diversifying into business model portfolios offer incommensurable cross-fertilization 
opportunities to effectively compete in today’s turbulent business landscape. How? Through innovation 
and flexibility. This is precisely the secret to Amazon’s success: business model experimentation. In the 
words of Jeff Bezos: “I believe we are the best place in the world to fail, and failure and invention are 
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inseparable twins. To invent you have to experiment, and if you know in advance that it’s going to work, 
it’s not an experiment.”25 
Thus, one of the key aspects in effectively competing in today’s business environment is organizational 
agility26. Managers must always keep an eye for new opportunities, but must also critically ensure that 
their organizational culture supports such flexibility and openness.  Established firms do possess an 
advantage as they control a greater resource base, and have integrated many more unique capabilities than 
any of the most disruptive new entrants. The secret lies in never resting on one’s laurels. Leveraging 
business model diversification – as we observed at Amazon, Apple, or many other organizations – offer a 
myriad of growth prospects for the optimal deployment of resources and capabilities to exploit changing 
market opportunities. 
 
 13 
ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
This article extensively draws upon the contributions of Aversa, Furnari and Haefliger (2015), and their 
investigation of the Formula 1 racing industry, in which firms leverage multiple business models – up to 
six – to generate manifold revenue streams from the same technology. In exploring the following 
questions: “Which configurations of business models are associated with high and low-levels of 
performance in a technology-based environment? What is the nature of the complementarities underlying 
high-performing configurations?” they found that the high-performing configurations all featured the joint 
adoption of two specific business models, which was not featured in any low-performing firms. This 
configuration enabled firms to access critical resources, but most importantly was linked by capability-
enhancing complementarities – which fostered faster learning whilst strengthening the firms’ focus on 
their core activities. 
Our reasoning with regards to business model portfolio diversification was initially instigated by the 
scouting, collecting, monitoring and analyzing of more than 50 cases of iconic business models — or what 
we call exemplars — within the Business Model Zoo™ initiative (led by Prof. Charles Baden-Fuller at 
Cass Business School). Launched in 2012, this research program has sought to classify investigate various 
business models — in terms of their design and execution — across a various range of contextual 
environments, in order to trace the former’s economic consequences and harvest possibilities for future 
endeavors.  
Deriving our ideas from the constant monitoring of business model diversification instances amongst 
these organizations — and others — this article builds on the aforementioned contributions to investigate 
the synergies between resources and capabilities for business model portfolios deployed within one large 
organization. Specifically, our initial research explored the following question: “What are the logics of 
business model diversification in creating value for the firm?” We based our study on a qualitative 
longitudinal analysis of the various business models adopted by Amazon.com during the 1995-2016 
period. We followed a multi-step process to construct a 21-year longitudinal database, containing 
information on Amazon.com’s business models and financial performance. We first collected secondary 
data from a broad range of publicly available and reliable sources, from which we constructed a basic 
timeline of “major events” pertaining to Amazon’s organic growth. The latter was then coded and 
analysed building on Baden-Fuller and Mangematin’s (2013) conceptualization of business model 
elements, encompassing four dimensions: customer sensing (number of customer groups), customer 
engagement (value proposition for each customer group), value-chain and linkages (network of actors 
through which the product/service is delivered to customers), and monetization mechanisms (pricing, 
complementary assets). This enabled the identification of Amazon’s seven distinctive business models, 
and whose synergies were further qualitatively examined. Our research revealed that Amazon’s portfolio 
 14 
encompassed five complementary business models, and the latter configuration provides the e-commerce 
megalith with access to critical resources that serve to augment its value creation activities, fuel strong and 
positive network effects for the explosive growth of its core e-retail platform (i.e., by expanding the scope 
of available products), which in turn work to strengthen its capabilities (i.e., continuously improving the 
customer experience). We substantiated this research by building on existing literature to identify iconic 
cases of business model diversification, in order to assess portfolio synergies – thus providing the practical 
insights for the identification of this article’s key questions. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table  1: Leading question 
THE LEADING QUESTION 
How does business model diversification work to create value for the firm? 
       
       FINDINGS  Value creation guides the configuration of a business model portfolio in order to generate diverse 
resources and capabilities that include but go beyond bottom-line contributions. 
  Ensuring that your portfolio of business models optimally exploits your resource base, creates 
synergies and cross-fertilization opportunities for cost and operational efficiencies as well as risk 
reduction. 
  Positive complementarities across a portfolio’s activities create idiosyncratic cross-capability 
synergies, which in turn generate unique growth and core performance enhancement opportunities. 
  The essence of a business model portfolio’s value lies in it converging a firm’s activities to reach a 
“global optimum;” not solely in terms of its financial profitability. 
 
 
Table 2: Successful diversification 
HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY DIVERSIFY INTO BUSINESS MODEL 
PORTFOLIOS 
 
Firms seeking to leverage business model diversification can a follow a common set of mechanisms 
in order to comprehensively examine how to leverage their resources and capabilities — as to create 
cross-business-model linkages and exploit the potential of cross-business-model synergies. 
 
1 Start by asking what is that your firm does, and more so what it does best. 
2 Carefully examine and delineate the structure of the current business model(s) activities. 
3 Clearly outline the key resources your firm possesses, then inquire into how you can mobilize these 
physical assets to generate an additional commercial use, or to cater an additional market segment. 
4 Fit the novel business model so that it fully integrates your organization’s core capabilities. 
5 Seek to constantly innovate with what you already possess, whilst remaining open to new ideas. 
6 Always examine your business models from configurational perspective. 
7 Flexibility is key: where you find that one business model does not generate the coveted intra-
portfolio synergies, don’t be afraid to drop it. 
8 Ensure that their organizational culture supports such flexibility and openness. 
9 Develop efficient coordination and integration mechanisms to guarantee strategic control at the 
corporate level. 
10 Frequently “audit” your business model portfolio to make sure the “whole” galvanizes what you do 
best. 
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Table  3: Amazon Business Models 
Constitutive 
parts of a 
Business 
Model 
BM1: Marketplace BM2: Prime BM3: Fulfilment  
Customer 
sensing 
Triadic Matchmaking: links 
together 2 customer groups – 
buyers and sellers. Both 
groups pay, but transaction fee 
is charged to the seller; the 
buyer pays for product. 
Servitized product: 
Dyadic - 1 group: loyal 
customers who frequently use 
AM. Directly pays.  
Servitized product: Dyadic - 1 
group: sellers on Amazon.com 
Customer 
engagement 
Buyers: Amazon provides 
access to a huge range of 
products and prices. Buyers 
can also post reviews and rate 
products, and have also access 
to other buyers’ reviews. 
Sellers: They can list their 
products for free on several 
Amazon websites through a 
single seller account. 
 
Sellers: They can list their 
products for free on several 
Amazon websites through a 
single seller account. 
Bus-based: product offered as 
a bundle of complementary 
services, which include: early 
access to sales, Kindle library, 
storage service, video and 
music streaming, expedited 
shipping, photo storage, and 
30-day trial. 
Taxi-based: Amazon 
Fulfilment centers warehouse, 
pick, pack and ship products to 
buyers, and handles customer 
service. Offers additional 
services aimed at scaling 
business and extending sellers’ 
customer base. Single seller 
account provides access to all 
regional websites.  
Value-chain 
linkages 
Highly integrated system: 
Amazon links together buyers 
and sellers through an 
internet-based self-service 
platform. Its high-performing 
servers enables Amazon to 
deal with huge volumes of 
traffic. All payments are 
handled by Amazon, thus 
controlling fraud protection.  
Highly integrated system: 
complement products leverage 
assets controlled by Amazon. 
Highly integrated network: 
Amazon takes care of 
shipping, inventory 
management and warehousing. 
Monetization Single pricing for buyers: pay 
the price listed on website. 
Single pricing for sellers: pay 
a fixed percentage of buyer 
purchase price.                            
Timing of payments: Amazon 
collects payments from buyers 
upon purchase, but pays out 
money to sellers later (CCC: 
roughly – 30 days). 
Complementary assets: Prime 
for buyers and FBA for sellers 
Single-pricing: Annual 
subscription of 99$ paid in full. 
Complementary assets: Serves 
as incentive to drive Amazon 
Marketplace sales by providing 
free expedited shipping. 
Pay-as-you go monetization 
system: charges fee per storage 
space and order fulfilment. 
Does not charge shipping 
costs. Charges for optional 
business services may apply. 
Complementary assets: 
complements transaction fee of 
Marketplace BM.  
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BM4: Web 
Services 
BM5: Instant Video BM6: Consumer 
Electronics Manufacturing 
BM7: Mechanical Turk 
Simple product: 
Dyadic- 1 group: 
small developers 
and software-based 
start-ups. Pay 
directly. 
Simple product: Dyadic – 1 
group: entertainment 
consumers with access to 
Internet OR Prime members. 
Simple product: Dyadic – 1 
group: typically other 
Amazon BM customers, 
who consume Amazon 
Consumer Electronics 
alongside other Amazon 
goods. 
Triadic Matchmaking: Links 
together 2 customer groups – 
providers and requesters of 
“Human Intelligence Tasks.” 
Bus-based: uses its 
automated web-
infrastructure to 
offer cloud-based 
computing 
platforms. 
Bus-based: subscribers enjoy 
unlimited streaming of 
Amazon’s database of 
movies and TV shows. 
Bus-based: Customers 
purchase standardized, scale 
product as part of the wider 
Amazon eco-system. 
Main products: Kindle, 
Kindle Fire, Fire TV, Fire 
Phone, Dash Button. 
Main features: inexpensive 
and easy to use. 
 
Successful products such as 
the Kindle support Kindle 
Store e-book consumption.  
 
Fire Phone was 
unsuccessful, albeit its 
attempt to create linkages 
with other BMs (i.e., Firefly 
button, free Amazon Prime 
etc.) 
Amazon links together the 
two target customer groups 
through a technological 
platform, thus facilitating 
their interactions.  
 
Providers and requesters:  
Bus-based mode of 
engagement. Links together 
providers who seek additional 
revenues by offering their 
services to satisfy the needs 
of requesters – who seek 
services which cannot be 
completed by a computer 
(i.e., HITs) 
Integrated: 
leverages its own 
web and data 
infrastructures and 
sells it to customers. 
Licenses content from 
network providers, film 
studios and distribution 
company.  
Integrated: Lab126 
engineers design products. 
Distributes through its e-
store or via retailers 
(depends on products: Fire 
Phone and AT&T) 
Highly integrated system: 
Amazon links together 
providers and requesters 
through an internet-based 
self-service platform. 
Pay-as-you-go 
monetization 
system: fee per 
storage space. 
If not part of the annual 
Prime subscription, monthly 
subscription of $6.58/ 
month.                                       
Complementary assets: 
serves as an incentive for 
joining Prime. 
Single pricing: Single price 
at time of purchase. 
Complementary assets: 
Serves as incentives to 
increase other BM sales, 
such as Kindle and Kindle 
Store, or Fire TV and Instant 
Video, etc 
Requesters pay roughly a 
20% transaction fee directly 
to Amazon, upon completed 
task (and the requester’s 
satisfaction). 
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Figure 1: Business models, resources, capabilities and performance 
